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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE} OF PROCEEDINGS 
In addition to the jurisdictional grounds cited by 
appellant, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4A, Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals, in that the Supreme Court has 
poured-over this case to the Court of Appeals for disposition. 
This is a suit for breach of contract originally filed by 
the plaintiff in the Third Judicial District Court on 14 
November 1986. (R-002). Thereafter and subsequent to partial 
discovery in the matter. Defendant State Farm moved for summary 
judgment, (R-042) , and the motion was granted on 7 August 1987, 
(R-107-110). On 27 August 1987, the court entered its findings 
of uncontroverted fact, conclusions of law, and summary judgment 
against the plaintiff. (R-lll-114) . Plaintiff filed its notice 
of appeal with the Supreme Court on 24 September 1987. 
(R-115-116). On 3 December 1987, the case was poured-over to the 
Court of Appeals for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Were the affidavits submitted by plaintiff sufficient to 
create an issue of fact as to when negotiations ceased or do they 
contain but unsubstantiated conclusions? 
2. Is the mere resubmission of an insurance claim a form of 
negotiation? 
3. Was plaintiff led to believe that its claim would in 
- 1 -
fact be reconsidered? 
4. Did State Farm, through its agent Richard G. Webb, 
encourage or instigate the resubmission of plaintiff's claim? 
5. Is the one-year contractual limitation period tolled 
pending formal denial of the claim by the insurer, or does it 
begin to run on the date of loss as the "crystal clear" language 
of the policy indicates? 
6. Did State Farm waive enforcement of the contractual 
limitation provision by engaging in negotiations after the 
one-year period had run? 
7* Is State Farm precluded from asserting the contractual 
limitation defense by reason of its failure to affirmatively 
plead it, even though plaintiff was given adequate notice of the 
defense and had an opportunity to meet it? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
N/A 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a suit for breach of contract originally filed by 
the plaintiff in the Third Judicial District Court on 14 November 
1986 • (R-002). Thereafter and subsequent to partial discovery 
in the matter. Defendant State Farm moved for summary judgment, 
(R-042) , and the motion was granted on 7 August 1987, 
(R-107-110) . On 27 August 1987, the court entered its findings 
of uncontroverted fact, conclusions of law, and summary judgment 
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against the plaintiff. (R-lll-114). Plaintiff filed its notice 
of appeal with the Supreme Court on 24 September 1987. 
(R-115-116). On 3 December 1987, the case was poured-over to the 
Court of Appeals for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Hedman Investments, Inc. acquired a business office policy 
of insurance from State Farm on 3 January 1984. (R-016, 111). 
Hedman Investments, Inc., at all relevant times, was located at 
948 East 7145 South, Suite 104, Midvale, Utah. (R-017, 111). On 
25 July 1985, a fire occurred at the Creekview Apartments, which 
are owned and operated by Hedman Investments, but which are 
located at 961, 963 and 965 East South Union, Midvale, Utah. 
(R-017, 112). A claim was filed by Hedman Investments with State 
Farm concerning lost rents at the Creekview Apartments on 28 
January 1986. (R-017, 112). State Farm denied the claim on 7 
March 1986, because the loss occurred at the Creekview Apartments 
and not at the insured's (i.e., Hedman Investments1) place of 
business. (R-017). Plaintiff thereafter brought suit against 
State Farm for breach of the insurance contract, alleging that an 
agent of State Farm had told Hedman Investments that the 
insurance policy would not only cover loss of income at its place 
of business, the office, but would also qover lost rents at the 
Creekview Apartments. (R-017-018). Hedman Investments was only 
paying an annual premium of $80.00 for the subject policy. 
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(R-018). 
The suit was filed on 14 November 1986, (R-002) , 
approximately sixteen months after the fire had occurred. State 
Farm thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment which assumes 
for purposes of the motion that the lost rents were covered by 
the subject policy. The motion was based on the following 
condition which is contained in the policy: 
No action shall be brought unless there has been 
compliance with the policy provisions . . . and the 
action is started within one year after the 
occurrence causing loss or damage. 
(R-030) (emphasis added). 
State Farm argued that plaintiff's suit was barred because 
plaintiff failed to bring the action "within one year after the 
occurrence [the fire] causing loss or damage." (R-016-020). 
State Farm relied on four Utah decisions which clearly sustained 
such a proposition. 
Plaintiff countered by arguing, inter alia, that State Farm 
had waived enforcement of the contractual limitation provision by 
continuing to engage in negotiations with plaintiff regarding its 
claim after the one-year period had run. (R-090-104). Plaintiff 
submitted two affidavits in support of this contention, but the 
court found them to be simply conclusory and therefore 
insufficient to create a question of fact. See Transcript of 
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Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at paqe 14, lines 8 - 9 . 
Plaintiff then argued that a form of negotiation occurred when 
plaintiff resubmitted its claim with State Farm during the latter 
part of the summer of 1985. The court ruled that the mere 
resubmission of an insurance claim, absent some assurance by the 
insurance company that the claim would indeed be reconsidered, is 
not a form of negotiation. (R-108-109, 113). Plaintiff then 
"admit[ted] there [were] no other facts upon which it [could] 
rely to claim waiver or estoppel," (R-108); consequently, the 
court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The affidavits submitted by plaintiff are insufficient in 
that they fail to indicate whether State Farm actually re-opened 
negotiations with plaintiff or simply reaffirmed its previous 
denial when plaintiff resubmitted its claim. This is critical 
because as stated by the Maryland Court of Appeals, 
11
'negotiation' connotes something more than the flat refusal of a 
simple request." Brown v. Bradshaw, 226 A.2d 565, 569 (Md. 
1967). If each time plaintiff "contacted" or "discussed" its 
claim with State Farm, State Farm simply reaffirmed its previous 
denial of the claim, no negotiations took place and hence no 
waiver of the contractual limitation period. "Negotiation" is 
simply not a unilateral process as plaintiff would have this 
Court believe. It is a process of "mutual arrangement. 
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discussionf and bargaining." 65A C.J.S. Negotiate at 1078 
(1966). It is a process that involves not only the submission of 
offers [claims] but the consideration of offers as well. 66 
C.J.S. Negotiation (Supp. 1987). It is much more than the "flat 
refusal of a simple request." Brown, 226 A.2d at 569. Moreover, 
plaintiff concedes that its claim never was reconsidered by State 
Farm. (R-077-078) . At all times State Farm "[stood] on its 
original denial." (R-088). 
Plaintiff's counsel, however, argues that State Farm Agent 
Richard G. Webb encouraged or instiqated the resubmission of 
plaintiff's claim, but there is absolutely nothing in the facts 
that would indicate that this occurred. The affidavit of John G. 
Hedman simply states that Mr. Webb "assist[ed] [plaintiff] in 
presenting the claim again to State Farm." (R-077). The 
language is "assist[ed]," not "encouraged" or "instigated." 
Moreover, to argue that plaintiff was led to believe that its 
claim would again be scrutinized by State Farm is simply without 
merit. To the contrary, plaintiff was told on at least three 
separate occasions that it "wouldn't do . . . a bit of good" to 
file even its original claim with State Farm since there was 
clearly no coverage with respect to the fire which occurred at 
the Creekview Apartments. Deposition of John G. Hedman, page 
120, line 14 - page 125, line 17; Deposition of Richard G. Webb, 
page 63, line 14 - page 64, line 14; page 68, lines 11-16. 
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Because there was no waiver of the limitation provision, it 
must be enforced as written. It begins I to run on the date of 
loss and is not tolled pending denial of the claim by the 
insurer. This is the law in Utah. 
Finally, since plaintiff was given notice of State Farm's 
intention to rely on the contractual limitation provision 44 days 
prior to argument on the motion, and had an opportunity to meet 
it. State Farm should not be precluded from raising the defense 
by reason of its failure to affirmatively plead it. All the 
rules of procedure require is notice of the issue raised and an 
opportunity to meet it. Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 
1963) . Plaintiff would have had no more notice had State Farm 
formally moved to amend its answer. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Summary Judgment was properly granted because there were 
no genuine issues as to any material fact. 
A. The affidavits submitted by plaintiff merely 
contain unsubstantiated conclusions and naked 
assertions and are therefore insufficient to 
create an issue of fact. 
In Massey v. Utah Power & Light, 60^ P.2d 937 (Utah 1980), 
the Supreme Court held that the lower court had properly granted 
summary judgment in U.P. & L.'s favor because, inter alia, the 
affidavits submitted by the plaintiff contained but "naked 
assertions of negligence," stating as follows: 
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A motion for summary judgment is an effective means 
of ascertaining the existence of undisputed facts 
that will support a judgment as a matter of law and 
thus avoid the necessity of trial. Of course, 
summary judgment is appropriate only if the 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and other 
submissions of the parties reflect that there is no 
genuine issue of a material fact. However, bare 
contentions, unsupported by any specification of 
facts in support thereof, raise no material questions 
of fact as will preclude the entry of summary 
judgment. 
Id. at 938. 
Moreover, in Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 
1985) , the Supreme Court again enunciated the same principle: 
"An affidavit which merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated 
conclusions and which fails to state evidentiary facts is 
insufficient to create an issue of fact." 
State Farm contends that the affidavits submitted by 
plaintiff are simply conclusory and as such are insufficient to 
create an issue of fact. 
The affidavit of William G. Gibbs simply states that he and 
"representatives of Defendant State Farm continued to negotiate 
and discuss Plaintiff's claim . • . after July 26, 1986." 
(R-071). However, as correctly noted by the court below, this is 
but a mere conclusion reached by the affiant. Transcript of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 13-15. 
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During the hearing on State Farm's motioh for summary judgment, 
the court queried plaintiff's counsel as follows: 
THE COURT: Is there anything in the record any 
place where they re-opened negotiation? Is there any 
sworn testimony? It is one thing to say, "Well, you 
know, we contacted the insurance company and there 
was continual contact." But what if every time you 
called on the phone you say, "We cjon't want to talk 
to you. We have denied it already, it is over with." 
And that is the only thing thetre is. Is there 
anything in the record from the sworn testimony that 
State Farm, after its letter of denial, re-opened its 
thinking and negotiated? 
MR. NELSON: Your Honor, al]| I can point the 
Court to are the statements in Mr. Gibbs1 affidavit. 
I will direct the Court to those paragraphs, if the 
Court wishes. I believe it is paragraph four. 
Paragraph four in the name of Mr. Gibbs1 affidavit. 
THE COURT: Read us that paragraph. 
MR. NELSON: I will do that. "Thereafter, 
Affiant had several conversations with the State 
Department of Insurance relating to such matter. 
Furthermore, Affiant had conversations with counsel 
and representatives of State Farm insurance regarding 
settlement of plaintiff's claii|a. Conversations 
occurred after July 25, 1986. At no time during any 
such post-July 26, 1986, conversations with agents of 
Defendant State Farm Insurance Company, did any agent 
or representative inform Affiant that the limitation 
period contained in the policy of insurance would be 
exercised. To the contrary, agents and 
representatives of Defendant State Farm Insurance 
continued to negotiate and discuss Plaintiff's claim 
with Affiant after July 26, 1986." 
THE COURT: That is a conclusion that has been 
reached in the affidavit, that there was a 
negotiation. Is there anyplace Where anyone from 
State Farm actually said, well — they actually made 
statements that did, in fact, re-open negotiations? 
MR. NELSON: I will point the Court to the 
letter of Mr. Webb who is, as I have pointed out to 
the Court, an agent of the Defendant State Farm. 
That letter is dated September 29, 1986, and is 
attached as Exhibit E. 
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THE COURT: And what pertinent part of that do 
you think is important? 
MR. NELSON: I think it is important that he 
indicates there he has stated they are going to stand 
on the original denial of the claim at this time due 
to the fact they feel there is no commitment, I 
believe there was. I was under the impression there 
was language there disclosing a reconsideration of 
the claim. 
THE COURT: Is it in there or isn't it? 
MR. NELSON: I don't see it in this letter. Your 
Honor. 
Id. 
The Affidavit of William G. Gibbs "fails to state the 
evidentiary facts" upon which is based the assertion that 
negotiations occurred after July 25, 1986. See, supra, Williams 
v. Melby, 699 P.2d at 725. The affidavit fails to state whether 
State Farm actually re-opened negotiations with plaintiff or 
simply reaffirmed its previous denial of plaintiff's claim. This 
is important because as stated by the Maryland Court of Appeals 
in Brown v. Bradshaw, 226 A.2d 565, 569 (Md. 1967), 
"'negotiations' connotes something more than the flat refusal of 
a simple request." Volume 65A of C.J.S. Negotiate at 1078 
(1966) expounds by defining the term "negotiate" as meaning "to 
procure by mutua1 intercourse and agreement with another; . . . 
to bring about by mutual arrangement, discussion, or bargaining." 
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, if during the post-July 25, 1986 
conversations between Mr. Gibbs and representatives of State 
Farm, State Farm simply reaffirmed its previous denial, no mutual 
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intercourse, arrangement, discussion, or bargaining occurred— 
hence no negotiation. "Negotiation" simply is not a unilateral 
process as plaintiff would have the Court Relieve. 
Since the affidavit of William G. Gibbs contains but bare 
contentions, unsupported by any evidence indicating that State 
Farm actually re-opened negotiations regarding plaintiff's claim, 
i 
the affidavit is insufficient to create an issue of fact. 
For similar reasons the affidavit of John G. Hedman is also 
insufficient to create an issue of fact. Nowhere in his 
affidavit does Mr. Hedman state that State Farm actually 
re-opened negotiations and reconsidered his claim. In fact this 
was conceded by plaintiff's counsel during oral arguments. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this question again. 
Webb that we have 
: he made that in 
Is there any statement made by Mr. 
here under oath, any statement tha 
any way indicated that State Farm was now going to go 
ahead with negotiations? 
MR. NELSON: I think from the insured's point of 
view, yes. 
THE COURT: I don't care wfyat the insured's 
point of view is. Every person has something in 
their own mind. I know your position so far is the 
agent told the insured, "I will resubmit the claim or 
I will contact the company to s\ee if they will 
reconsider." Now, is there anything other than that 
that the agent said to the insured that would 
indicate that State Farm has reconsidered and now 
moving ahead to renegotiate it? 
MR. NELSON: I don't know of anything, Your 
Honor. I do think those are significant, if the 
Court will bear out for just a moment. Bear with me. 
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because the reason I think it is important from the 
insured's point of view, at least, as to what a 
reasonable person would infer from those 
circumstances, is because the real issue we are 
talking about is whether or not, under the 
circumstances of the case, it is just inequitable to 
allow the one year period which is discovered in the 
law quite widely. It is in derogation of the 
statutory period. 
In view of that underlying sort of matrix, what 
that person reasonably infers from the actions of the 
agent of the companv is important whether or not he 
goes ahead and files a lawsuit. 
THE COURT: There is no question about that. I 
am bearing down on Webb. I just need your strongest 
point in order to analyze this myself. I know your 
position is that he, in behalf of the insured, 
recontacted State Farm to see if they would 
reconsider their denial. Now, other than that, were 
there any other statements that he made to your 
insured? 
MR. NELSON: I am not aware of any. 
THE COURT: That would lead your insurer [sic] 
to believe that State Farm had indeed reconsidered or 
was going to renegotiate with him. 
MR. NELSON: I am not aware of any. Your Honor. 
I think there is also a substantial 
question of fact as to whether or not there were 
negotiations ongoing that should prevent, I think, 
the averments in the affidavits. Although they may 
be comments. Your Honor, do raise before this court a 
substantial question of material fact as to whether 
or not negotiations were ongoing. That in and of 
itself, that question of fact as to when negotiations 
stopped. 
THE COURT: That is why I asked you that here 
today. I see that as the key issue. That is the 
reason I asked you. Is there anything else, any 
other sworn facts other than the statement by Webb, 
"I will contact the company and see if they will 
reconsider"? 
MR. NELSON: No. As I indicated to the Court, I 
- 12 -
am not aware of any. 
Transcript of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 18-20f 
26-27. 
The affidavit of John G. Hedman contains but bare assertions 
and unsubstantiated conclusions. At no place in his affidavit 
does he state that State Farm actually re-^ opened negotiations and 
agreed to reconsider his claim. And that is precisely what 
negotiation is. As stated in 66 C.J.S. Negotiation (Supp. 1987), 
"'Negotiation' is a process of submission and consideration of 
offers [claims] until an acceptable offer is made and accepted." 
(Emphasis added.) Moreover, "negotiation" is "[a] process of 
discussion in which both or all parties express or exhibit 
interest in a common objective and attemptl to resolve differences 
with the mutual end of agreement." [id. (emphasis added). 
Therefore, since the affidavit of John G. Hedman, like the 
affidavit of William G. Gibbs, fails to state whether State Farm 
and displayed an 
im, it should be 
actually re-opened negotiations 
interest in reconsidering his cla 
stricken as conclusory and deemid insufficient to 
create an issue of fact as correctly ruled by the 
court below. 
Nor is plaintiff entitled to a reasonable inference that 
negotiations occurred. To the contrary, all competent evidence 
indicates that State Farm simply reaffirmed its previous denial. 
In responding to plaintiff's request for reconsideration. State 
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Farm, through its agent Richard G. Webb, stated that it was going 
"to stand on [its] original denial of the claim." (R-088). 
Moreover, plaintiff concedes that State Farm "den[ied] any 
reconsideration of [his] claim." (R-077-078). Therefore, the 
facts without question indicate that plaintiff's claim was never 
reconsidered, that negotiations were never re-opened. At all 
times State Farm "[stood] on its original denial." (R-088). 
B. The "resubmission of a claim" cannot be 
equated with negotiation or the 
"reconsideration of a claim" as argued by 
plaintiff in its brief. 
To hold that the mere resubmission of a claim is a form of 
negotiation would make negotiation in this instance a unilateral 
event, which it definitely is not. As argued, supra, the term 
"negotiate" has been defined as meaning "to procure by mutual 
intercourse and agreement with another; . . . to bring about by 
mutual arrangement, discussion, or bargaining." 65A C.J.S. 
Negotiate at 1078 (1966) (emphasis added). "'Negotiation' is a 
process of submission and consideration of offers [claims]." 66 
C.J.S. Negotiation (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added). It is "[a] 
process of discussion in which both . . . parties express or 
exhibit interest in a common objective and attempt to resolve 
differences with the mutual end of agreement." Id., (emphasis 
added). Because the term "negotiation" connotes mutual 
discussion and bargaining, courts have held that the "flat 
refusal of a simple request" is not a form of negotiation. 
Brown, 226 A.2d at 569. 
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In the case sub judice there was no mutual discussion or 
bargaining with reference to plaintiff's resubmitted claim, but 
rather a flat refusal of reconsideration -- hence no negotiation. 
Moreover, in Anderson v. Beneficial Fire and Casualty 
Company, 21 Utah 2d 173, 442 P.2d 933 (1968) the Supreme Court of 
Utah was confronted with this very issue and held that the mere 
resubmission of an insurance claim cannot be equated with a 
reconsideration of that claim. Rather there must have been 
assurances that the claim would indeed be 
at 934. 
reconsidered. See id. 
As previously noted, there werfe no assurances of 
reconsideration in the case sub judice hiut rather only a flat 
refusal of reconsideration. 
Plaintiff's counsel seeks to circumvent the court's ruling 
in Anderson v. Beneficial by (1) suggesting that Mr. Webb 
encouraged or instigated the resubmission of plaintiff's claim, 
and (2) by arguing that plaintiff was led to believe that its 
claim would indeed by reconsidered. However, despite plaintiff's 
counsel's suggestions to the contrary,! there is absolutely 
nothing in the record which would indicate that Mr. Webb 
encouraged or instigated the resubmission of plaintiff's claim. 
The affidavit of John G. Hedman merely states that Mr. Webb 
- 15 -
"assist[ed] [plaintiff] in presenting the claim again to State 
Farm for reconsideration," (R-077), and is devoid of anything 
which would suggest that Mr. Webb instigated or encouraged a 
resubmission of the claim. Moreover, plaintiff's contention that 
it was led to believe that its claim would again be scrutinized 
and reconsidered by State Farm is simply without merit. Nothing 
in the facts suggests that plaintiff was led to believe that its 
claim would be reconsidered; plaintiff was not encouraged to 
refile, nor did State Farm indicate that it would re-open 
negotiations and again consider plaintiff's claim. To the 
contrary, the record indicates that plaintiff was informed on at 
least three separate occasions that it "wouldn't do . . . a bit 
of good" to file even its original claim with State Farm. 
Deposition of John G. Hedman, page 120, line 14 - page 125, line 
17; Deposition of Richard G. Webb, page 63, line 14 - page 64, 
line 14; page 68, line 11-line 16. And there is nothing which 
would indicate that the circumstances were any different 
concerning the second claim. 
Because the references to negotiations in the affidavits 
submitted by plaintiff are but conclusory, and because the 
unilateral act of resubmitting a claim with an insurer is not a 
form of negotiation, summary judgment was properly granted since 
there existed no genuine issues as to any material fact. 
- 16 -
II. Summary Judgment was also properly granted because 
State Farm was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
A. The law in Utah is that one-year contractual 
limitation periods, which are commonly found in 
insurance contracts, are valid and enforceable and 
are not tolled or suspended pending denial of the 
claim by the insurer but rather commence to run as 
written on the date of loss, although they may be 
deemed waived if the insurer fails to deny the 
claim in a timely fashion and continues to engage 
in negotiations after the period has run. 
Plaintiff argues what was rejected by our Supreme Court some 
twenty years ago in the case of Anderson v. Beneficial Fire and 
Casualty Company, 21 Utah 2d 173, ^42 P.2d 933 (1968). 
Plaintiff's argument is that the one-year limitation period 
should be tolled until the claim is formally denied by the 
insurer, i.e., that the period does not begin to run on the date 
of loss as the "crystal clear" language of the policy indicates, 
but rather commences to run only when the claim is formally 
denied. Plaintiff interestingly cites Anderson v. Beneficial in 
support of this proposition but fails ^o specify that he is 
quoting from the dissent. See Brief of Appellant at 11, 16. 
What the Court actually held in Anderson v. Beneficial was that 
the language used in the limitation provision was "crystal 
clear," that the period was not tolled pending denial of the 
claim but rather commenced to run on the date of loss, and that a 
denial by the insurer three weeks prior to the one-year deadline 
was timely since that provided the insured with "ample time" 
within which to file suit. 442 P.2d at 93 3. 
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Moreover, as recently as 1983 the Supreme Court has cited 
Anderson v. Beneficial for support in holding that the limitation 
period commences to run on the date of loss and that a denial by 
an insurer 60 days prior to the one-year deadline is timely. See 
Hibdon v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 657 P.2d 1358 (Utah 1983). 
Since the limitation period begins to run on the date of 
loss, herein July 25, 1985, and since State Farm denied 
plaintiff's claim some four and one-half months prior to the 
one-year deadline, leaving plaintiff with more than ample time 
within which to bring the action, plaintiff's suit was properly 
dismissed because it neglected to file the suit until November 
14, 1986, sixteen months after "the occurrence causing loss or 
damage." See policy (R-030). 
Plaintiff next argues that State Farm waived the limitation 
provision by continuing to negotiate with plaintiff until 
September 29, 1986, and cites Anderson v. State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Company, 583 P. 2d 101 (Utah 1978) for the proposition 
that an insured is to be given a reasonable time within which to 
bring suit after termination of negotiations. Although the law 
cited by plaintiff is correct, the facts are not. As argued in 
Section I of this brief, there is absolutely nothing in the 
record which would indicate that State Farm negotiated with 
plaintiff after March 7, 1986, the date on which it denied 
plaintiff's claim. During all subsequent conversations. State 
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Farm simply reaffirmed its previous denial. Moreover, the 
unilateral act of resubmitting a claim, especially when told that 
"it wouldn't do a bit of good," simply cannot be equated with 
negotiation, which involves mutual intercourse, discussion, and 
bargaining. Plaintiff was not encouraged to re-file. 
Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted by the 
court below because there were no genuine issues as to any 
material fact and State Farm was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. 
III. In the interests of justice. State Farm should not be 
precluded from asserting the contractual limitation 
defense by reason of its failure to affirmatively 
plead said defense because plaintiff was given 
adequate notice of the defense and had an opportunity 
to meet it. 
In Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963), the 
plaintiff argued that the defendants should not be allowed to 
rely upon a subsequent agreement which purportedly superseded and 
replaced the agreement upon which the lawsuit was brought since 
the defendants had failed to plead the subsequent agreement as an 
affirmative defense. The Supreme Court responded as follows: 
Plaintiff also raises the procedural point that 
since defendants did not plead the subsequent 
agreement as an affirmative defense, they should not 
have been permitted to rely thereon. It is true, as 
plaintiff insists, that Rule 8(c), ip.R.C.P., requires 
that affirmative defenses be pleaded. It is a good 
rule whose purpose is to have the issues to be tried 
clearly framed. But it is not th6 only rule in the 
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book of Rules of Civil Procedure, They must all be 
looked to in the light of their even more fundamental 
purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure 
to the end that the parties are afforded the 
privilege of presenting whatever legitimate 
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute. 
What they are entitled to is notice of the issues 
raised and an opportunity to meet them. When this is 
accomplished, that is all that is required. Our 
rules provide for liberality to allow examination 
into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the 
controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other 
party to have a reasonable time to meet a new issue 
if he so requests. Rule 15(b), U.R.C.P., so states. 
It further allows for an amendment to conform to the 
proof after trial or even after judgment, and 
indicates that if the ends of justice so require, 
"failure so to amend does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues." This idea is confirmed 
by Rule 54(c)(1), U.R.C.P.: ,f[E]very final judgment 
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose 
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party 
has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." 
. . . The trial court not only did not abuse his 
discretion in allowing the issue to be raised and 
receiving the contract in evidence, but he would have 
failed the plain mandate of justice had he refused to 
do so. 
Id. at 91 (emphasis added). 
The underlying purpose of the rules of procedure was again 
emphasized by the Court in First Security Bank of Utah v. 
Colonial Ford, 597 P.2d 859, 861 (Utah 1979): 
[I]t could not be made plainer that the underlying 
purpose of the rules is that judgment should be 
granted in accordance with the law and the evidence 
as the ends of justice require; and that this is true 
whether the pleadings are actually amended or not. 
We therefore accept defendant's position that even 
though they had not pleaded the defense of mistake, 
that should not preclude them from urging and relying 
on that defense if that was what the interest of 
justice required. 
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Moreover, in Olpin v. Grove Finance Company, 521 P.2d 1221, 
1223 (Utah 1974) the Court noted three exceptions to Rule 12(h), 
Utah R. Civ. P., the last of which is relied upon by State Farm: 
It is true, as plaintiff contends^ that this is an 
affirmative defense [failure of consideration] which 
is required to be pleaded, and unless it is , it 
ordinarily should not be allowed as a defense, unless 
there was a motion to amend, or the parties acquiesce 
in the trial of that issue, or the plaintiff was 
otherwise given notice and an opportunity to meet it. 
(Emphasis added.) 
As noted in the above quotations, it matter not whether the 
pleadings are actually amended and affirmative defenses pled so 
long as opposing counsel is given notice of the issue raised and 
an opportunity to meet it. This is so because justice requires 
that the parties be afforded the privilege] of presenting whatever 
legitimate contentions they have pertaining to the dispute. 
In the case sub judice plaintiff was given notice of State 
Farm's intention to rely on the contractual limitation provision 
contained in the policy on June 9, 1987 whfen State Farm filed its 
motion for summary judgment. (R-042). Plaintiff then had 
44 days, until July 23, 1987, the date of ^he hearing, to prepare 
to meet the defense. (R-lll). Moreover, the hearing, which had 
been originally scheduled for July 6, 1987, was continued until 
July 23, 1987 so as to provide plaintiff With extra time to meet 
the defense. (R-049-50). The purpose envisioned by the rules 
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was fully complied with. Plaintiff was given notice of the 
defense and had over six weeks to prepare to meet it. As stated 
by Cheney, 381 P. 2d at 91, "When this is accomplished, that is 
all that is required [by the rules]." Plaintiff would have had 
no more notice had State Farm formally moved to amend its answer. 
Moreover, the case of Staker v. Huntington Cleveland 
Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983), cited by plaintiff, is 
inapposite. State Farm has not sought to raise this defense on 
the morning of trial, two years after the litigation was 
commenced. In its brief plaintiff states that "extensive 
discovery" had been engaged in and that the case was "nearly 
ready for trial" when State Farm raised the defense of the 
one-year limitation period. See Brief of Appellant at 23. 
However, this is contrary to what was stated by plaintiff during 
oral arguments on the motion. See Transcript of Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment at page 21, lines 4 - 8 . Moreover, a 
notice of readiness for trial had not been filed by the plaintiff 
and only two depositions had been taken and one set of 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents drafted. 
The case was still young. 
Since plaintiff was given adequate notice of the defense 
while the case was yet young and was provided with a six-week 
opportunity to prepare to meet it. State Farm should not be 
precluded from raising the contractual limitation period by 
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reason of its failure to affirmatively plead it. 
CONCLUSION 
For the fo:reg°in<? reasons State Farm respectfully requests 
that this Courts affirm the order of the lower court granting 
summary judgment in State Farm's favor. 
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